

NERC CIP Version 6 -

An EMS Vendor's Perspective



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AGENDA



- CIP version 3/5 vs 6
- Vendor Challenges
- CIP-013 Supply Chain Security



Version 5 vs 6

- Version 6 resulted in updates to a number of CIP standards:
 - CIP-003-6 – Security Management Controls
 - **CIP-004-6** – Personnel & Training
 - CIP-006-6 – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems
 - **CIP-007-6** – System Access Control
 - **CIP-009-6** – Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems
 - **CIP-011-2** – Information Protection
- SCADA/EMS **vendor focus**



CIP-004-6: Background Checks



➤ V6 Changes

- Training for Transient Cyber Assets & Removable Media

➤ Other notable V5 changes (from v3):

- PRA for current residence & all locations in prior 7 years
- Review of vendor PRA criteria and process
- Access revocation within 24 hours for remote interactive access for all terminations
- Access for “exceptional circumstances”



➤ Issues Encountered:

- **Responsible Entities want to conduct their own background checks**
 - This approach is problematic for protection of vendor employee private information
 - Increased liability for RE's that store vendor's employee private information
 - Not required by NERC – see CIP-004-6 R3.4
 - Don't write your policy to require background checks completed by your company
- **Drug Test Requests**
 - Not required by NERC
 - Costs must be borne by the RE requesting this service
- **Identity Confirmation – e.g. copies of I-9 forms, driver's license**
 - No protection of vendor employee private information provided to RE's
 - Vendors already collect this information for their employees
 - Vendors are considered a general contractor – our employees are not “contractors”
 - USCIS does not require collection of I-9's for general contractors
 - Redacted copies are acceptable to most vendors
 - Don't require personal information in your policy



- **Recommended Vendor Approaches:**
 - Train all development and engineering personnel to NERC CIP v5-6 annually
 - Have all employees complete a background check that meets CIP-004-6 PRA requirements
 - Provide secure online access to employee redacted background checks and training records supporting CIP documentation
 - Provide attestation documents as required



CIP-007-6: System Access Control

➤ V6 Changes

- Updates for Transient Cyber Assets & Removable Media

➤ Other notable V5 changes (from v3):

- Ports & Services - protection against unnecessary use of ports
- Security Patch Management changes
 - 35 day evaluation + 35 day implementation period
 - Designation of vendor as patching source
- Malicious code prevention
 - Broader “non-prescriptive” definition not limited to Anti-virus tools
 - Consider white-listing, network isolation, & IDS/IPS solutions
 - Automatic mitigation recommended
- Security event alerting
 - Requirement for separate alerting when logging system fails



Issues Encountered

➤ Ports & Services

- What is acceptable level of detail for justification statements
- Vendors can & should only provide basic description to confirm port usage
- Anything more is vendor proprietary and a potential security risk

➤ Malicious Code

- Automatic quarantine or IPS solutions can be dangerous
- Several critical executables have been flagged as false positives by AV software
- Automatic vulnerability scanning tools interfere with production communications
- Security must be balanced with system reliability



Recommended Vendor Approaches:

- **Removable Media**
 - Options to disable all USB ports in software, re-enable by admin control
- **Ports & Services**
 - Provide complete & detailed documentation of all ports & services on all systems
 - Provide justification statements for all ports and services for vendor software and common O/S or 3rd party tools
- **Provide Patch Management Services for all O/S & 3rd party patches**
- **Malicious Code**
 - Support several 3rd party solutions for whitelisting & HIDS



CIP-013-1: Supply Chain Security

➤ FERC Order 829 Objectives:

- Software Integrity and Authenticity
- Security of Vendor Remote Access to BES Cyber Systems
- Information System Planning & Procurement
- Vendor Risk Management & Procurement Controls

➤ Schedule:

- CIP-013 Requirements approved by NERC entities in July
- NERC board adoption occurred in August
- FERC review beginning September – approval in 3-9 months?
- Implementation timeframe 1 year after FERC approval (late 2018/2019?)



CIP-013-1: Supply Chain Security

- **CIP-013 contains 3 requirements:**
 - R1 – develop supply chain security risk management plans for BES Cyber systems
 - R2 – Implement the plan
 - R3 – Review and update the plan
- **CIP-013 Implementation Guidance Document (new)**
 - Directions to responsible entities on example methods to comply
 - Expectations on utilities and vendors to negotiate new procurement contracts that include security controls based on risk assessment
 - Requirements for vendors to be audited/certified to an industry standard (eg. NIST, SOC2)
- **Changes to CIP-010-3 to verify vendor software integrity/authenticity**
- **Changes to CIP-005-6 for vendor remote access**



➤ CIP-005-3 Changes

- R2.4 – Methods for monitoring vendor remote access sessions
- R2.5 – methods to disable active vendor remote access sessions

➤ Vendor Recommended Approach

- No permanent connections allowed
- Connection initiated by utility using specific protocol/procedure to verify identity
- Vendor employees are always electronically escorted
- Vendor view-only session is available and preferred
- Utility maintains dedicated accounts for vendor employees that conduct remote control sessions



Issues & Recommendations:

- **Two factor tokens for vendors**
 - Vendors can't maintain tokens for 10-20 employees for XXX utilities
 - Keep tokens at utility; provide code verbally to vendor when connecting
 - This ensures utility approval of connection and is consistent with NERC guidance on this topic
- **Use utility vs vendor's preferred connection method**
 - Special requirements for utility remote access arrangements can waste valuable time when systems are in trouble
 - Corporate remote access has different requirements than EMS remote access
 - Utilities should draft a remote access policy jointly with your EMS vendor to consider needs and capabilities on both sides



➤ CIP-010-3 changes

- R1.6 – for a change that deviates from the baseline: verify the identity of the software source and the integrity of the software

➤ Vendor Preferred Approach

- Provide software updates/patches via secure sites (eg. HTTPS, SFTP)
- Provide certified hash values of software via a separate link or repository
- Use of vendor or 3rd party tools to verify hash values in baselines
- Optional – vendor digital signature of software for authenticity



➤ Many vendor issues & challenges:

- Risk based vs prescriptive approach contradictions
- Diversity of approaches in regions or by auditors will be expensive and unachievable by many suppliers
- Potential requirement for vendors to meet multiple security certifications will be costly (e.g. NIST vs SOC2 vs SIG vs ISO)
- EMS vendors can't control 3rd party software vendor security
- Security departments gone wild



➤ Recommendations

- You have only 1 (or 2) EMS vendors
- Don't place EMS vendors in the same category as business partners providing HR services, financial, etc.
- EMS vendors don't have (or want) your Employee personal information (social security, HIPPA, etc) or customer information
- Adjust & scale your security requirements appropriately based on risk
- A high dose of common sense is required by all parties to arrive at sensible supply chain security

